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RATIFICATION IN AGENCY WITHOUT KNOWL-
EDGE OF MATERIAL FACTS.
The question for discussion is whether in cases of agency by
ratification the doctrine that notice to the agent is notice to the
principal has any application. Some of the general principles from
which the argument is to proceed may be set forth in a few senten-
ces. Where one without the semblance of authority assumes to
act as the agent of another, that other may ratify the act and there-
by acquire the rights and assume the obligations that would have
been his had the agent's assumed authority been actual. In like
manner, where an agent, whose authority is limited, acts on his
principal's behalf beyond the scope of that authority, the principal's
subsequent ratification is, in most respects at least, equivalent to
actual prior authority. Further, where an agent is acting for his
principal, within the scope of his authority, notice to or knowledge
possessed by the agent, germane to the subject matter of the agen-
cy and affecting the execution of the agency, will with some excep-
tions be deemed to be notice to or the knowledge of the principal.
This knowledge must have been acquired by the agent while he
was acting as such; or, if acquired previously, must have been ac-
tually present in the agent's mind during the execution of his
agency, and it must have been knowledge which he was at liberty
to disclose to his principal. In cases where the knowledge of the
agent is relied upon to affect the validity or the consequences of
action on the part of the principal himself, the communication of
such knowledge must have been within the scope of the agent's
duty and there must have been an opportunity, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, to communicate such knowledge to the princi-
pal before he acted. Neither in cases where the agent is acting
nor in cases where the principal is acting will notice to the agent
be deemed notice to the principal where it is known to be to the
agent's own interest to conceal his knowledge from his principal,
or where he is known to be violating his duty and is acting in fraud
of or contrary to the interest of his principal. I
The maxim ratihabitio retrotrahitur et inandato priori aequi-
paratur has come to express an established doctrine of our law.
i. Innerarity v. Bank, Z39 Mass 332; cf. Fouche v. Mferchants' Bank,
xio Ga. 827, 842-848.
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And if ratification is equivalent to prior authority, and, relating
back to the beginning, makes actual ab initio the pretended authori-
ty of the agent, does it not follow that such agent must be regarded
as having been acting within the scope of his authority all along and
make his knowledge the presumed knowledge of his principal
whether actually communicated or .not? To some extent it seems
to have been assumed that it does. It has been stated that in two
cases a ratification may be absolutely binding upon the principal,
even though made in ignorance of some material fact: first, where
the principal wilfully chooses to remain ignorant of the fact and to
ratify notwithstanding-a statement with which one can scarcely
take issue; and, secondly, where knowledge of the fact will be im-
puted to the principal. Will it ever be so imputed? "Where the
agent was authorized to act, but departed from his instructions,
there is a presumption that the principal knows all the facts." 2
It has also been said: "If a principal ratifies a contract or other
transaction entered into or done for him by another without au-
thority, he is chargeable with the other's knowledge of fraud, ille-
gality, or other facts in the transaction." 8 In so far as these state-
ments lay down the proposition that a party may be held to have
ratified unauthorized acts without actual knowledge of material
facts connected therewith, on the ground that such knowledge will
be imputed to him, they appear to be based upon a petitio princi-
pii. Notice will not be imputed to a principal unless an agency
covering the specific transaction is somehow brought into exis-
tence. To bring-it into existence by ratification requires a knowl-
edge, either real or imputed, of all the material facts. But such
knowledge cannot be imputed on the ground of agency, because
the very object of imputing the knowledge is to establish the fact
of agency.
The question may arise in a number of different cases, and the
principles to be applied in them are not identical. It may be at-
tempted to charge a principal upon a transaction entered into by one
who had no authority to act for him in any matter whatever, or by one
who had a limited authority but acted in excess thereof. The ques-
tion may arise in cases between the principal and the agent, or be-
tween the principal and the party with whom the agent came di-
2. Huffcut on Agency, Ed. 2, § 37, citing Meehan v. Forrester, 52 N. Y.
277; and Hyatt v. Clark, i 8 N. Y. 563. But it is further stated that this
doctrine has not been recognized in all cases.
3. Clark and Skyles on Agency, § 476. The statement quoted above is
made, however, as a part of the discussion of the doctrine of imputed notice,
and not with especial reference to ratification as such.















tion t t t e ri ci al kno s all the facts." 2















t t ri i l t rt it t t i-
. ff t . . , . iti n 'lI. rrester, . .
; tt 'U. l rk, lIS . . . t it i t t t t t t i
t i e t ized i ll .




rectly into contact (called herein the third party), or between the
principal and outside parties not actually participating in the trans-
action with the agent. It may arise in actions where the principal
is attempting tQ obtain relief against the third party, and in actions
where the third party sues the principal. The material fact with
knowledge of which the principal is sought to be charged may be
an act of the agent himself and part of the transaction, such as a
misrepresentation or a warranty; or it may be an extrinsic fact,
such as a lien, a trust, or other equity of an outside party.
For our present purpose there is very little distinction to be
drawn between cases where the agent had no prior authority of any
kind and cases where he merely exceeded authority that he actually
possessed (though in one of the statements quoted above the distinc-
tion was apparently drawn). It may be that in the latter case con-
duct will be held to amount to a ratification that would not be suffi-
cient in the former case. But in neither case is the principal bound
to ratify the unauthorized act, and he is not even bound to make
inquiries concerning it or to be diligent to acquaint himself with the
facts. I Instead, it is the duty of the third person to acquaint the
principal with the material facts. 5 In both cases it may well be
said to be the agent's duty to acquaint the one on whose behalf he
assumes to act with all the material facts at -once, but in neither case
has the third party a right to suppose that the agent will do this
duty. The principal has not held him out as a person likely to do
this duty; and if a subsequent ratification by the principal is such
a holding out, the third party cannot take advantage of it, because
he did not rely upon it and was not induced by it to act. There
has been no such holding out even in the secord case, where the
agent had some authority but exceeded it. He has there been held
out by the principal only as one whom third parties may trust to
perform such duties as are within the scope of the authority he has.
The third party is here bound to know that the agent is acting
in excess of his authority (for if he was within his apparent author-
ity the third party will not be depending upon ratification); he
knows that the agent is not obeying instructions, and this is surely
positive notice that the agent is not to be depended upon. At all
events, if the third party trusts the agent in this regard, it is at his
own risk and not because the principal has induced the trust.
As between the principal and the agent there is no possible
foundation for charging the principal with knowledge merely be-
4. Combs v. Scot, 12 Allen, 493; cf. Meehan v. Forrester, 52 N. Y. 277.
S. Wheeler v'. Northwestern Sleigh Co., 39 Fed. 347.
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cause the agent has such knowledge. The agent himself knows
that the facts have not been communicated. One of
the results of a real ratification is that the agent is relieved
from all liabilities except those which would have fallen upon him
had he been acting with authority; but he will be relieved from no
liability to the principal by reason of a ratification made by the
latter in ignorance of -facts not communicated by the agent. 6
As between the principal and the third party, a distinction must
be drawn between cases where the third party is suing the principal
and cases where the principal is suing the third party. In the latter
case it is obvious that the principal cannot hold the third party upon
any different contract or transaction than the one into which such
third party actually entered, even though the principal's suit is
brought in ignorance of material facts that were part of that trans-
action. But this is not at all the same thing as saying that the
principal has ratified the contract or act of his agent, notwithstand-
ing his ignorance of the facts. If he does ratify, he must ratify as
to the burdens and obligations as well as to the benefits. The only
contract the third party can be held to is the one he made. If the
principal continues to press his suit after he has become acquainted
therein with the facts of which he was previously ignorant this
may constitute a ratification; but it will not be upon the ground of
imputed notice, but because he then has actual notice. In any
event he must fail in his attempt to extort the benefits from the
third party, when he himself has not assumed the burdens.7 So
if the principal attempts to hold the third party to a contract made
through an agent, who made an unauthorized warranty as a part
thereof, the principal must make good the warranty also. 8 In
such case it is wholly unimportant to determine whether or not the
agent had apparent authority to make the warranty. 9 If an agent
sells his principal's goods on terms other than those within his real
or apparent authority, if the principal is unwilling to ratify those
terms he is not entitled to sue at all on the contract for the price, 10
and persevering in his action with knowledge of those terms may
be a ratification. So also, if the agent has entered into an illegal
transaction on behalf of his principal, as where he has made an
6. See Bank of Owensboro v. Western Bank, 13 Bush (Ky.) 526.
7. E4berts v. Selover, 44 Mich. 5x9; Brigham v. Palmer, 3 Allen, 450;
Wheeler & W. Mfg. Co. v. Aughey, 144 Pa. 398.
8. Loomis v. Vawter, 8 Kan. App. 437.
9. See Eberts v. Selover, supra.
zo.' Shoninger v. Peabody, 57 Conn. 42; but see Stewart v. Woodward,
50 Vt. 78.
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illegal sale of liquors, the principal is not entitled to reap the bene-
its of the transaction, and to maintain an action for the price, with-
out assuming the burdens. He cannot separate the transaction in-
to two parts-a sale of liquors and an illegal intent-and ratify
the former while repudiating the latter. 1 The real remedy of the
principal in such cases-and he will not be deprived of it because he
has seemed to ratify, in case his ratification was in ignorance of
material facts-is to repudiate the whole transaction and to sue
in replevin or in trover in case goods of his have come into the pos-
session of the third party through the unauthorized act of the
agent. 12 It might be held that he cannot regain his goods if they
have come into the possession of bona fide purchasers; but this is
not the proper doctrine, and anyway it would not be on the ground
of ratification, as will appear hereafter.
The question most commonly arises, however, in cases where
the third party attempts to hold the principal upon a contract or
transaction entered into by the agent and later ratified by the prin-
cipal. It is the universal doctrine that in such case a ratification
is not binding upon the principal unless made with knowledge of
all material facts, 1 3 or unless made intentionally in conscious ignor-
ance; 4 though to constitute a ratification, if the principal knew
all the facts it is not necessary that he should have understood their
legal effect. 15 The receiving and retaining of benefits under a con-
trict is no ratification when the principal was ignorant of represen-
tations or collateral contracts made by the agent as part of the
transaction. 18 It is among these cases that the doctrine of imputed
notice should appear, if it is to appear anywhere in the case of
agency by ratification. But, as indicated heretofore, there is no
ground for its appearance, and as a matter of fact it does not so
appear in the decisions. In all the long line of cases holding that a
principal whose agent has exceeded his authority is not bound by
a ratification made in ignorance of material facts, the agent actu-
3i. Backman v. Wright, 27 Vt. 187; see also Singleton v. Bank of
Monticello, 113 Ga. 527.
i2. See Brigham v. Palmer, 3 Allen, 450; Shoninger v. Peabody, 57
Conn. 42.
13. Combs V. Scott, 12 Allen, 493; Roberts v. Rumley, 58 Iowa, 301;
Wheeler v. Northwestern Sleigh Co., 39 Fed. 347.
x4. Phosphate of Lime Co. v. Green, L. R. 7 C. P. 43, 58; Meehan v.
Forrester, 52 N. Y. 277; Lewis v. Reed, 13 M. & W. 834.
3S. Hyatt v. Clark, ir8 N. Y. 563; Kelley v. Horse Ry., x4r Mass. 496.
x6. Wheeler v. Northwestern Sleigh Co., 39 Fed. 347; Smith V. Tracy,
36 N. Y. 79; Baldwin v. Burrows, 47 N. Y. 199.
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ally had knowledge of those facts, but in not one case is the know-
ledge of the agent imputed to the principal. It is
safe to say that the third party can no more hold a principal to a
contract that he did not knowingly ratify than a principal can hold
the third party to a contract that he did not make. In both cases
the plaintiff must show affirmatively that he has a cause of action
against the defendant; and in case the third party is plaintiff, it
is essential for him to show affirmatively that the principal's ratifi-
cation was made with knowledge. So far is the law from holding
the principal to know what his agen.t knows in these cases, that it
does not even throw upon him the burden of proving that he had
no actual knowledge. 27 Suppose an agent has sold goods with
an unauthorized warranty; knowledge that the agent made it is
not imputed to the principal, and his ratification of the transaction
is worthless unless made with actual knowledge that a warranty
was given. 18 Where an agent sold corporate stock, agreeing with-
out authority that a certain dividend already declared thereon
should be included, it was held that the principal's receiving the
price from the purchaser, in ignorance of the unauthorized agree-
ment, was no bar to his recovering the amount of the dividend in
a suit against the corporation. 19 Accepting, and using goods that
an agent was directed to buy for cash, but which he actually
bought on credit, is no ratification; 20 nor is there a ratification
where the principal receives the consideration from an agent with-
out knowing the terms of the contract by which it was obtained. 21
It is even held that the retention, by the principal, after he has ob-
tained knowledge of the unauthorized acts of the agent, of the
benefits of the transaction, does not amount to a ratification of it
in case the reason for the principal's failure to return the benefits
is that their identity is lost, 22 or that the property received has been
disposed of so that it has become impossible or useless to return
it, 23 or that it cannot now be returned without loss to the prin-
17. See Combs v. Scott, sufira.
x8. Smith v. Tracy, 36 XN.'Y. 79.
rg. Wheelerv. Northwestern Sleigh Co.. 39 Fed. 347.
,o.Manning v. Gasharie,27 Ind. 399.
21. Penn. D. &- M. Nav. Co. v. Dandridge. 8 Gill & J., 248.. 323; cf.
Meehan v. Forrester, 52 N. Y. 277.
22. Schutz v. Jordan, 32 Fed. 55.
23. Humfnlirey v. Havens, 12 Minn. 298; Martin v. Hickman, 64 Ark.
217; Swayne v. Ins. Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 49 S. W. 5r8; and see Henry V.
Wilkes, 37 N. Y. 562.
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RATIFICATION IN AGENCY.
cipal. 24 It would seem that in such cases the principal would be
under a quasi contractual obligation to pay for benefit received,
but it seems correct to say that the principal's conduct does not
amount to ratification.
Where the third party is attempting to hold the principal liable
for the misrepresentation, fraud, or other tort of the agent on the
ground of ratification, the rule laid down by the courts is found to
be the same as where the principal is to be held liable on unau-
thorized contracts. As a general thing, where an attempt is
made to charge the principal for the tort of an agent,
the liability of the principal is based upon some real or apparent
authority conferred by him upon the agent, although in many cases
the principal's liability has been determined by the doctrine that
one who sets an instrument in motion should be responsible for in-
juries done by it so long as it acts within the course of the employ-
ment, a doctrine more properly applicable to servants than to
agents. 25 But in some cases the basis of the principal's liability
has been an alleged ratification, and to show such ratification it
is uniformly required that the principal be shown to have ratified
with actual knowledge of the tort for which he is to be held liable.
Such knowledge will not be imputed to him, and there is no pre-
sumption that the agent has told him of the tort. Thus a princi-
pal is not chargeable with the fraud of his agent, in an action of
deceit or otherwise, on the ground of ratification, unless he knew
of the fraud when he ratified. 28 In such case the ratification is no
ratification of the fraudulent representations. In Lewis v. Read, 27
defendant authorized bailiffs to distrain for rent and to seize any-
thing found on the place but nothing elsewhere. The bailiffs
seized sheep belonging to plaintiff (who was not the tenant),
which were not on the tenant's place when seized. The sheep were
sold and defendant received the money, without knowledge, how-
ever, that the sheep had been outside the boundary when seized.
The court says: "Mr. Read could not be liable in trover unless he
ratified the act of the bailiffs, with knowledge that they took the
sheep elsewhere than on Penybryn (the farm in question); or
unless he meant to take upon himself, without inquiry, the risk of
any irregularity which they might have committed and to adopt
24. Bryant v. Moore, 26 Me. 84.
25. See Huffcut on Agency. Ed. 2.
26. Colvin v. Peck, 62 Conn. xs5; Nichols v. Bruns, 5 Dak. 28; Keefe v.
Shall, iSr Pa. 9o .
27. 13 M. & W. 834.
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all their acts." There is no suggestion here that the knowledge of
the bailiffs might be imputed to the defendant.
The case of Hyatt v. Clark 28 has been cited to sustain the doc-
trine that the knowledge of the agent may be imputed to the prin-
cipal so as to make that a ratification of an unauthorized act which
otherwise would not be, 20 but in fact the court decided no such
thing. In that case an agent, acting under a power of attorney,
made a lease, conditioning it upon the principal's approval. The
principal was never informed of this condition. She actually dis-
approved of the lease, but on being informed by her agent that the
lease was binding, she accepted rent from the tenant. There was
doubt as to whether the power of attorney authorized the agent to
make such a lease. The court held that it was not necessary to
resolve this doubt. Either the agent was authorized or he was not.
If he was not, the principal was bound to know that, for she execu-
ted the power, and hence she must be regarded as knowing that
she was not bound by the lease. If she knew one good ground
for repudiating the lease, she did not need to know two such
grounds. The court did not hold that in this event the knowledge
that the lease was conditioned on her approval would be imputed
to the principal, but merely that under such circumstances the
fact was not material (a conclusion possibly open to criticism in
itself). If, on the other hand, the agent was authorized by the
power of attorney to execute the lease, then the acceptance of
rent would bind the principal; for in such case the knowledge of
her agent would be imputed to her, and she would be presumed to
know that the lease was conditioned on her approval. But under
this supposition, the agent was acting within the scope of his au-
thority; the agency was established by the power of attorney and
not by the ratification; the agent was held out as worthy to be
trusted to do the very thing he failed to do, and the tenant was
justified in believing that the agent would do his duty within the
scope of his authority and report all the terms of the contract
to his principal.
It seems safe to conclude that where the third party seeks to
hold the principal by virtue of a ratification, he must affirmative-
ly show that the principal had actual knowledge of every material
act or representation of the agent and every other material fact
forming a part of the transaction, and that the principal will not
be presumed to have had knowledge of them merely because the
agent had.
28. xr8 N. Y. 563.
29. See Huffcut on Agency, Ed. 2, §37; Clark and Skyles on Agency, §107.
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principal as never infor ed of this condition. t ll i -
approved of the lease, but on being infor ed er a e t t t t
lease as binding, she acce te r t fr t t t.
dotJ.bt as to hether the po er f att r e t ri t t t
ake such a lease. he court el t at it s t r t
resolve this doubt. ither t e a e t s t ri r t.
H he as not, the ri ci al s t t t,
ted the po er, and hence s e st r r i
s e· as t t l .
for repudiating the lease, s e i t t t
grounds. he court did not l t t i t is t t l
that the lease as c iti e r r l l
to the principal, t r l t t r i t
fact as not aterial ( l si i l t iti i
itself). If, on the other hand, the a e t as t ri t
po er of attorney t e ec te t l s , t t
r.ent ould bind the ri ci al; f r i s t l
her agent ould be i puted to her, and s e l r s gl t
kno that the lease as c iti e r r l. t r
this supposition, t t ti it i t
thority; the agency as established t r ' f tt r
not by the ratification; the agent as el t s rt t
trusted to do the very thing e faile t , t t t
justified in believing t at t e t l i t it i
scope -of his a t rit r rt ll t t tract
to his principal.
It see s safe to conclude that here t t ir rt t
hold the pi"incipal by virtue f a ratificati , st ffir ti e-
ly sho that the principal had actual le e f r t ri l
act -or representation of t e a e t r t r t ri l t
for ing a part f the tra sacti , t t t i i al ill t
be presu ed to have had le e f t r l
agent a .
28. '1I8 . . 563.
29. See Huffcut on gency, Ed. 2, §37; lark and kyles e c , I .
RATIFICATION IN AGENCY.
There remains but one further phase of the matter for con-
sideration. What are the doctrines to be applied as between the
principal and outsiders who were not directly involved in the trans-
action with the agent? Should the law, in favor of such outsiders,
impute to the principal knowledge that his agent possesses, though
the agent exceeded his authority and the principal's ratification
was in ignorance of material facts? Such knowledge, as we have
seen, is not imputed to the principal in favor of the third party who
dealt with the agent; but such third party had no sufficient reason
for supposing that the agent would inform his principal as to the
facts, and he had an opportunity to protect himself. It is not
necessarily so as to outsiders, who may not know or have the
chance to know that the agent exceeded his instructions or even
that an agent existed.
The question may arise in various ways. Suppose A, acting in
the name of P, buys property of Z, A having knowledge that it
had been obtained fraudulently from X. Later P, in ignorance of
this defect, approves the deal, receives the property, and pays the
price. Three questions may arise: i. Can X recover the property
or its value from P? 2. Can P repudiate the purchase and recover
the price from Z? 3. Can P hold A responsible in damages? The
answer to the first seems to be in the affirmative. P is not regarded
as a bona fide purchaser as against X, the knowledge of A being
for this purpose imputed to P. 10 But in this case the second and
third questions must also be answered in the affirmative. The
knowledge of A will not be imputed to P in favor of the agent and
the third party. There has been no ratification. Were the first
question to be answered in the negative, possibly the second and
third should also be so answered: not because in such case the
knowledge of A would be imputed to P, but because knowledge .of
the fact would then be immaterial to P. The decision that P is
not a bona fide purchaser and did not get good title as against X
is not at all the same as holding that P has ratified. It is not that
P has ratified the contract of purchase, but that he will not now be
allowed to retain the proceeds of such a contract as against an
equally innocent prior lienor. It may be correct to say that in
these cases the law imputes to the principal the knowledge of his
30. In the case of The Distilled Shiris, ii Wall. 356, one B, acting as
agent of H, bought liquors, B knowing that the liquors had been taken from
a bonded warehouse by fraud. The court held that B's knowledge was to be
imputed to H, that H was, therefore, not a bona fide purchaser, and that the
liquors in H's possession were forfeited to the government. It is reasonable
to suppose that B exceeded his authority in buying liquors to which good title
could not be obtained, although this does not appear in the report. See also
Russell v. Peavy, 13r Ala. 563, apparently supporting the doctrine of the text.
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agent, but it is not correct to say that there has been a ratification.
It is fair to impute the knowledge to the principal in favor of the
prior claimant, for it will not have the effect of holding the prin-
cipal to the unauthorized and disadvantageous contract or trans-
action, though it may have the effect of causing him a loss if his
vendor and his agent are irresponsible. The agent has been
party to a fraud on another while acting in the course of his em-
ployment and for the principal's benefit, and in such case the
general doctrines of agency should hold the principal irrespective
of knowledge and irrespective of ratification. If the principal in
such case insists on retaining the property after he learns of the
lien or claim of the third party, he puts himself practically in the
position of claiming the benefits and repudiating the burdens. This
he is never allowed to do. It remains true, however, that the
reason he is not a bona fide purchaser is that notice is imputed
to him.
This doctrine should not be applied in favor of bona fide pur-
chasers of goods that have been sold by an agent who had neither
apparent ownership nor apparent authority to sell on the terms he
made, where the principal has not himself acted so as to create an
estoppel. The principal, even though in ignorance of the facts
he received the proceeds, may repudiate the sale and reclaim the
goods from the possessor, whoever he may be. In this case the fact
of which the principal was ignorant is not the existence of a lien
or trust or other equity in favor of another, but is the existence
of an act or representation of the agent. Knowledge of such a fact
is not to be imputed to the principal in any case. The innocent
purchaser's title, in the absence of actual authority in the agent and
in the absence of an estoppel against the principal because of his
own conduct, depends upon ratification. There has been no ratifi-
cation. The principal is as innocent as the purchaser and his claim
is prior in point of time. The principal is not attempting to retain
the benefits while repudiating the burdens, but is repudiating the
whole transaction.
It thus appears that whether between principal and agent, prin-
cipal and third party, or principal and outsiders, whether the prin-
cipal is suing or being sued, a ratification is never to be based upon
the doctrine of imputed notice, although in one case knowledge of
extrinsic facts may be imputed to the principal even in the absence
of any ratification. The doctrine of ratification and the doctrine of
imputed notice have no connection. Ratification requires actual
knowledge of all material facts, and there is no exception.
Arthur L. Corbin.
NEw HAVEN, CONN.
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